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**AGRICULTURE OF THE ANDIJAN REGION IN THE FIRST YEARS OF THE
SECOND WORLD WAR (1941-1942)**

M.G. Abdullaev

doctor of historical sciences, Andizhan State University

Department of history of Uzbekistan

E-mail: muzrojon@list.ru

R. Abdurasulov

Andizhan State University base doctoral student of history of Uzbekistan

E-mail: r_abdurasulov@mail.ru

***Annotation:** The article analyzes the issues of adaptation of agriculture in the Andijan region to the needs of the war in the early years of World War II. In particular, the introduction of new types of crops into agriculture, problems and difficulties encountered in agricultural production are described. Statistical data on state obligations for the cultivation of cotton and other agricultural crops in the districts of the Andijan region in 1941-1942 and their fulfillment are summarized.*

***Keywords:** World War II, military mobilization, Andijan region, cotton growing, agricultural production, grain crops, government obligations, collective farm, state farm, vegetable gardening, advance in kind.*

On the eve of the war, in 1940, the total population of the Soviet country was 194.1 million, of which 131.0 million, or 67.5 percent, were rural. In the agricultural structure, the socialist sector was a priority, there were 236.9 thousand collective farms and 4.2 thousand state farms in the country, 18.7 million farms were organized in collective farms [1. P. 373]. The efficiency of the agrarian sector of the country's economy is very low, the collective farm economy is in a state of crisis, and in 1940-1941, food shortages in cities, difficulties in rural

areas were clear evidence of this. All this was the result of agrarian policies implemented by the leadership led by Stalin in the 30s of the 20th Century [2. P. 74]. The war that broke out dealt a more severe blow to the country's agriculture, the German-Nazi invasion severely weakened the agrarian potential of the USSR. The Nazi-occupied territories were inhabited by 40% of the country's population before the War [3. P. 166].

As early as the first months of the war, the country's main growing centers of wheat, sugar beets, sunflower – Ukraine and the North Caucasus-were under Nazi occupation. In the German-occupied territories, 38% of the grain grown in the entire country before the war, almost half of the technical crops, 87% of the sugar beets, 45% of the large cattle, 60% of the pig were grown [4. P. 143].

The enrichment of the southern and western regions of the country also led to a sharp decline in the technical supply of agricultural production. Before the war, 35% of all combines in the country and 28% of the tractor fleet, as well as a significant proportion of vehicles, were located in these areas. The German-Nazi occupation zone had 30% of the country's entire agricultural production Power [5. P. 369]. Due to difficulties in evacuating a number of agricultural equipment, it was dismantled or destroyed in local conditions, a certain number of tractors and cars were transferred to the disposal of the Red Army. By the end of 1941, the agricultural machine-tractor fleet had decreased to 242,000 tractors, 61,000 combines and 162,000 cars compared to the pre-war levels. The capacity of the surviving agricultural production was reduced by almost 60% of the pre-war Level [2. P. 415]. On the comparison territory of the Soviet Union (except for the territories occupied by the German-Nazi), in the collective and MTS, drive and traction techniques decreased by 32%, the number of cars decreased by 89%, and in the collective farms the labor force was significantly reduced [6. P. 7]. The enemy occupation of the most important agricultural producing regions of the country, as early as the first months of the war, further weakened the agricultural sector of the country's economy, creating great problems in providing food and raw materials behind the front and front. In extreme and unfavorable conditions, the peasants of the country took on the extreme task of putting agriculture on the Military Trail, providing the army and the population of the country with the necessary food and raw materials.

It is known that the Stalin regime brought unparalleled suffering to the peasants through forced collectivization and "ending the ears as a class", industrialization carried out at the

expense of the peasants' foreheads. Especially the terrible famine of the early 1930s left indelible tribulations in the fate of the villagers. The general attitude of the Soviet authorities towards peasant farms in the implementation of their strategic goals did not change even during the war years. Administrative-command methods such as violence against peasants, pressure, burdening heavy obligations were further strengthened. The entire power in the state was concentrated in the hands of the Stalin-led State Defense Committee (SDC). The Central Committee of the ECP (B) was practically transformed into a political branch of the State Defense Committee, the apparatus of the political bureau completely brought the activities of the Soviet government under its control.

Stalin's unrestricted absolute power led to shortcomings in his personality and the transformation of virtues into vices and vices of the entire state system. Stalin's mistakes, gross mistakes and open crimes cost the Soviet people a lot and increased the price of the victory over the Nazis many times. During the years of the brutal war, the main content of the agrarian policy of the Stalinist regime consisted in an administrative-command approach to agriculture and peasants in general.

From the first days of the war, such a heavy, complex responsibility was placed on the workers of the Central Asian republics, in particular Uzbekistan, the southern territory of the country. As early as the first years of the war in Uzbekistan, a new branch of Agriculture, lavaligilik, was established, which did not exist before, and a higher yield was achieved from this type of crop. In the Republic, the emphasis was placed on the development of grain farming, vegetable growing, gardening, animal husbandry, without reducing the yield of cotton.

The military pursuit of the agrarian sector of the economy was carried out in very difficult and complex conditions. From the first months of the war, the material and technical base of the village, the resources of Man, sharply decreased. After all, rural residents made up the bulk of the conscript age in the Republic, while in 1940 70% of the total population of the Republic consisted of rural residents. The villagers were the most numerous source of soldier supply for the army, with collective farm chairmen, accountants, agronomists, brigadiers, haidovci, tractors, mechanics, ordinary collective farmers and many of the state farm workers mobilized for war from the early days. In addition, a certain part of the villagers were also mobilized for the construction of defensive structures near the front, various works in coal mining and other industries. All this caused a significant reduction in the labor force in the

Republican collective farms, creating a shortage of resources in agricultural production.

In addition to men, agricultural equipment for the needs of the front – trucks, tractors, trailers, carriages and other tools were also taken. MTS, collective farms and state farms were forced to give the best techniques at their disposal for the needs of the war. Along with these, most horses in collectives and state farms were also taken for the needs of the front, while they were considered the main work animals in agriculture (land drive, cargo pulling and etc).

In 1941, in the Namangan region itself, 94 gas AA-47s, 5-47 cars and 1,420 horses were sent for the needs of the Red Army [7. P. 6]. During the war years, the supply of spare parts, fuel and lubricants for agricultural machinery also decreased. As a result of the shortage of such necessary tools, the sending of qualified tractors and mechanics to war, the effectiveness of existing equipment also decreased significantly. Meanwhile, the level of mechanization of agricultural production also fell from year to year. It was only possible to increase production based on horse and manual labor, observing the strict labor discipline to carry out an increasing volume of agricultural work.

The war thus had a devastating effect on the plight of the Republican agricultural producing forces. From the first year of the war, rural workers in Uzbekistan were forced to work in extreme conditions, in conditions of acute shortages of material, labor and food resources.

On the eve of the war, agriculture in Uzbekistan had a strong material and technical base. In the existing 189 MTS in the Republic, more than 19 thousand tractors of different types were concentrated, which served for agriculture [8. P. 2]. Due to the war, there were great difficulties in providing agriculture with new techniques, the number of tractors, cars and other agricultural techniques in agriculture decreased sharply. If at the beginning of 1941 there were 23 thousand tractors, 7.3 thousand cars in Republican agriculture, by the end of 1945 tractors had shrunk to 19 thousand, and cars to 1.6 thousand, plows used in land drive decreased from 732 thousand to 47 thousand in 1941-1945, cultivators from 55 thousand to 51 thousand, and seagulls from 719 to 247 [9. P. 36].

The work of the MTS of Uzbekistan to redirect its work for military purposes was carried out by the people's Commissariat of land and water affairs of the Republic. The commissariat was headed for the preservation and use of tractors and other agricultural techniques. Meanwhile, the war was also coordinating work such as repairing tractors and other equipment that had been

transplanted from the areas where the war was going, adapting them to work on local agricultural crops [10. P. 41].

Machine-tractor stations collective farm became important in the expansion of arable land, the development of new land. For example, the arable land in Republican collective farms was increased by 117.8 thousand hectares in 1941 itself compared to 1940. The arable land was largely expanded at the expense of new land development and water release.

According to the information of July 6, 1941, Cotton was planted in the Andizhan region on 126,593 hectares of land in the same year. The cotton fields in the raions were as follows: in Andizhan Region – 10,300 hectares, in Oltinkul Region – 10,170 hectares, in Lenin (Asaka) Region – 12,900 hectares, in Izboskan Region – 11,700 hectares, in Stalin (Shahrikhon) Region – 14,120 hectares, in oyim Region – 5,420 hectares, Voroshilov (Kurgontepa) Region – 10,600 hectares, in Khojaabad Region – 11,0000 hectares, in the Region – 7740 hectares, in the Region – 8600 hectares, in the fisherman's Region – 13743 hectares [11. P. 49].

Despite the hardships of the early War, the workers of the Andizhan Region handed over 297,000 tons of cotton to the state in 1941, the highest among the Republican regions. In 1941, while cotton yields averaged 17.4 centners per hectare in the Republic, yields in the Andizhan Region were very high, averaging 23.4 centners per hectare. Of the 629 collective farms in the region, 147 completed the state plan for the delivery of cotton by 100-110 percent, 118 by 110-120 percent, 222 by 120-150 percent, and 28 by more than 150 percent [12. P. 12].

In connection with the beginning of the war and the orientation of the national economy towards full military goals, the issue of planting agricultural crops and their productivity for the next 1942 was also revised. According to this, special attention was paid to expanding and increasing the yield of areas of cotton, grain and other food crops of strategic importance for the needs of the front. Strict obligations for the cultivation of these agricultural crops were established.

At the meeting of the Organizational Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR for Andizhan region and the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on April 21, 1942, the task was set to increase the irrigated cropland to 198,350 hectares in 1942 on collective farms of Andizhan region. In particular, on 30353 hectares of irrigated land, there is an obligation to grow grain, 134100 hectares of technical crops, 5500 hectares of vegetable crops and potatoes, and 28310 hectares of livestock fodder. The total irrigated

cropland is planned to be 198,263 hectares. In addition, it is planned to plant repeated crops on 2697 hectares of land [13. P. 24].

According to the plan, vegetable crops should be planted between rows of seedlings in orchards and orchards on 3970 hectares of land, grain crops (wheat, barley, flax, millet) should be planted on 9790 hectares of non-irrigated (rainy) lands, and grain crops (wheat, barley, flax, millet) on 5530 hectares of conditionally irrigated lands [13. P.25].

In 1942, the yield of grain in all categories of land was 17.1 quintals per hectare, cotton - 26.2 quintals, rice - 31 quintals, corn - 21 quintals, corn grain - 20 quintals, millet - 9.5 quintals, legumes - 7 quintals, potatoes - 95 centners, vegetables - 118 centners, sugarcane crops - 134 centners, red pepper - 4.5 centners, hay from fodder crops - 60 centners, alfalfa seeds - 1.5 centners per hectare, fodder - 300 centners, silage - It is defined as 120 centners [14. P.37]. Collective farmers are obliged to grow potatoes on 900 hectares of land [13. B. 28]. In addition, in 1942, the obligation to collect 136 tons of mulberry raisins and 200 tons of wild gooseberry in the Andizhan region [13. P. 28].

In 1942, 92,300 hectares of collective farms and state farms in the regions of Andizhan region were planned to grow grain crops, and instructions were given to grow grain crops on 1,937 hectares in auxiliary farms of organizations and institutions in the regions. A daily rate for harvesting grain crops (wheat, barley, millet) is set for each collective farmer. In particular, the daily requirement for harvesting millet on irrigated land is 0.4 hectares, wheat - 0.25 hectares, harvesting millet on irrigated land - 0.35 hectares, harvesting wheat - 0.30 hectares [13. B. 53].

As it can be seen from the above information, in 1942, cotton fields were increased by 7,500 hectares from the level of the previous year, and grain cultivation was also imposed on an area of more than 30,000 hectares. However, until now, grain was not grown on such a large area in the agriculture of Andizhan region. The obligations set for agriculture were an extremely difficult task in the conditions of reduced labor force and shortage of material and technical means.

In 1942, the plan of rice planting areas in the regions of Andijan Oblast was defined as follows:

In Andizhn region - 2174 hectares, in Oltinkul region - 475 hectares, in Lenin region - 1212 hectares, in Izboskan region - 2195 hectares, in Stalin region - 975 hectares, in Oyim region

- 745 hectares, in Jalolkuduq region - 800 hectares, in Voroshilov region - 1000 hectares, in Khojaobod region - 740 hectares, Pakhtaobod district - 928 hectares, Marhamat district - 1306 hectares, Balikchi district - 1050 hectares, 13600 hectares in the region. The average rice yield plan for the region is 31 centners per hectare. According to this, 42,160 tons of rice should have been grown in the region in 1942 [15. P. 41].

In general, for the year 1942, the obligation of productivity from grain and grain crops in oblast agriculture was defined as follows for individual regions:

Table

The yield plan of grain and cereal crops grown on irrigated land in Andizhan region in 1942 (per quintal per hectare of land) [16. P.16]

№	Regions	wheat	barley	rice	sorghum	corn	millet	beans	sesame
1	Andizhan	16,0	16,5	30,5	20,0	19,0	16,0	15,0	3,0
2	Oltinkul	16,0	16,5	31,0	23,0	23,0	19,0	15,0	3,0
3	Lenin	17,0	16,5	30,5	20,0	19,0	17,0	15,0	3,0
4	Izboskan	17,0	16,5	32,0	20,0	19,0	17,0	15,0	3,0
5	Stalin	15,0	15,0	30,5	20,0	18,0	15,0	15,0	3,0
6	Oyim	15,5	15,5	31,5	23,0	23,0	19,0	15,0	3,0
7	Jalolkuduk	17,0	16,5	31,5	22,0	23,0	19,0	15,0	3,0
8	Voroshilov	16,0	16,0	31,5	23,0	23,0	20,0	15,0	3,0
9	Khojaobod	16,0	16,0	31,5	22,0	23,0	20,0	15,0	3,0
10	Pakhtaobod	16,0	16,5	30,5	22,0	22,0	16,0	15,0	3,0
11	Marhamat	17,0	16,2	30,5	22,0	21,0	17,0	15,0	3,0
12	Balikchi	16,0	15,0	30,5	20,0	18,0	16,0	15,0	3,0

Average by region	16,0	16,0	31,0	21,0	20,0	17,0	15,0	3,0
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On May 28, 1942, preparations for harvesting wheat and other Bush crops were inspected in the regions of the Andizhan region. During the inspection, it was found that grain was planted on an area of 400 hectares in a collective farm named Karl Marx in the Culture Village Sovet of Pakhtaabad region, but did not receive the necessary preparation for its collection. That is, the existing 4 Grain mowing equipment and 2 wheat mowing equipment were not ready, and 40 chinks were without shearing. Collective farmers were not trained to mow wheat with chalk, the grain was intended to be harvested using only Sickles. Such shortcomings were also identified in other collective farms in the raion, in order to eliminate them, a quick letter was issued to the Pakhtaobod region party committee [17. P. 177-178].

In 1942, 17,470 workers and mechanized personnel were trained for collective farms and sovkhozes in the region in short-term courses to effectively establish agricultural work in the region. Of these, 16,950 were werewolves and field workers, 400 were tractors, 90 were accountants, 30 were harvesters [18. P. 92].

In 1942, Cotton was not harvested in the region under the established obligation. In 1941, Cotton was planted on 126,213 hectares of land in the region, yielding 297,000 tons (23.4 centners per hectare), while in 1942 Cotton was planted on 133,291 hectares of land, and the gross yield was 149,552 tons, or an average of 11.2 centners per hectare. In 1942, the highest yield on cotton was observed in Pakhtaobod region, which yielded an average of 17.6 centners per hectare of land in the Region. The lowest yield was obtained in the fisherman's Region, where Cotton was grown from an average of 7.3 centners per hectare of land. However, in the past 1941, The Fisherman's Region had an average yield of 16.3 centners per hectare [19. P. 42]. The main reason why the state obligations on cotton were not met was the mobilization of most men employed in cotton to war in 1942 and the lack of the necessary processing and care of cotton. In general, in 1942, the yield of cotton had decreased by 10-15 centners compared to the previous year, not only in the Andizhan region, but also in all regions of the Republic.

In the conditions of war, certain difficulties arose in the material condition of rural workers and the level of domestic life. These were primarily due to the fact that the entire focus was on the needs of war, with the promotion of the slogan "Everything for the front, everything for victory" throughout the country. According to this, it was mandatory that any product grown

by villagers – collective farmers, Sovkhoz workers, individual peasant farms-be taken to the needs of the front. Obligations on agricultural products were introduced not only for collective farms and sovkhozes, but also on products grown on the plantations of rural residents. On top of this, the villagers were also required to fulfill a number of taxes and obligations (military tax, enrollment in zayom, various charitable events of voluntary-mandatory appearance), which were introduced anew during the war.

Although there is no archival data on the difficult financial situation of the villagers during the war years, there is information on the remuneration that should be paid to collective farmers in return for their labor.

According to the directive of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and the Sovet of people's commissars of February 17, 1942 "on the procedure for issuing advance payments to collective farmers in monetary and natural accounts", collective farmers are shown to be given advance wages once a week, taking into account their average Labor Day. This indicated that 85% of the advance funds that collective farms received from the state for cotton were distributed among collective farmers on Labor Day, while the remaining 15% were spent on other costs of collective farms. Collective farms with advance funds at the expense of money from cotton to other crops (sugar beets, saws and other) could also distribute part of these monetary qualifications to collective farmers on an advance basis. In this case, it is envisaged that collective farmers who worked in the cultivation of sugar beets will receive an advance of at least 50 kopecks for each Labor Day [20. P. 112]. In general, when issuing an advance for a Labor Day to collective farmers, the amount of the advance should not exceed 50% of the collective farm's one-day salary.

In the conditions of war, in most collective farms in the Republic, the distribution of natural advances in the form of food products in exchange for Labor Day to collective farmers was not carried out or its procedures were violated. That is, grain and other food products that should be given to collective farmers were used in the fields for catering purposes organized for collective farmers, no natural advance was provided for the collective farm family, even if given, its amount was very small. In this case, there were serious problems in the food supply of elderly people and young children in the collective farm family [20. P. 125].

In other cases, advances in the natura form of collective farms (mainly grain) were distributed according to the need of individual collective farmers, not according to the collective

farmers ' Labor Day. This was a factor in the decline of the collective farmers ' material interest in collective farm work.

It was necessary that food products such as grain, oil, oil, sugar, industrial goods (aeration) were distributed by collective farms to collective farmers working in the cultivation of cotton, sugar beets and sawdust only on an advanced basis (depending on their performance of Labor Day obligations) [20. P. 125].

According to the standards set out as a sample, collective farmers were required to take 310 grams of grain, 10 grams of fat, 2.5 grams of dry tea, 46 grams of sugar as an advance in exchange for a day's labor [20. P. 116].

It is envisaged that a certain price is set by the state for each kilogram of the cocoon grown by collective farms and individual peasant farms, or natural payments will be made in exchange for the cocoon. In the decision of the Sovet of people's commissars of the USSR No. 1343 of December 2, 1943 "on measures for the development of silk production in collective farms and increasing the yield of sawdust" [21. P. 182] it was indicated that the collective farm communities of the Uzbek SSR would give 18 rubles 75 kopecks for each kilogram of the cocoon handed over to the state, or yarn of the same sum, as well as 1 som 25 kopecks of dry tea (25 grams), and for each kilogram of Cocoon grown in a separate collective farm, 9 som 50 kopecks of money (or gauze), as well as 50 kopecks of dry tea (10 grams) [20. P. 197].

In 1942, the average market price of agricultural products in Andizhan Region was: beef – 60 soums, mutton – 70 soums, one kilo of rice – 90 soums, one kilo of wheat flour – 50 soums, one kilo of barley flour – 30 soums, one kilo of wheat – 45 soums, one kilo of barley – 25 soums, one kilo of smoked oats – 45 soums, one kilo of Mecca doni – 70 soums, one kilo of mosh – 65 soums, one kilo of potatoes – 40 soums, one kilogram of cabbage – 30 Soums, one kilogram of carrots – 30 soums, one kilogram of apricots – 10 soums, one liter of milk – 8 soums, one gardener – 5 soums [22. P. 289].

By comparing the above data, one can witness that the difference between the amount of wages that collective farmers receive in return for their hard labor and the market prices of the most necessary foods is much higher.

In general, in the early years of the war, Andizhan was placed on the Military Trail in exchange for the hard work of agricultural laborers and specialized in supplying the necessary

products for the needs of the war. An important feature of these years was the increase in the types of agricultural crops. That is, in addition to cotton, in the agricultural sector of the region, the cultivation of grain crops, cereals, fat-producing crops such as Sesame, flax, as well as sugar beets have also been widely established. At the moment, attention has also been increased to vegetable growing, gardening, growing melons. As a result of the mobilization of men, the main labor force in the village, into the war, the main fists in agriculture were placed on women, the elderly and children. In such difficult, complex conditions, with the selfless labor of rural laborers, great results were achieved on the cultivation of various agricultural products, the results of which were a worthy contribution to the victory over fascism.

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